By Ch. Haroon Rashid
Background: Why the U.S. Blocked KAAN Engines
- Congressional refusal: The U.S. Congress has declined to authorize the export of GE F110 engines or related components for Turkey’s KAAN fifth-generation fighter program.
- Planned interim powerplant: Turkey intended to use the F110 for the first production batches of KAAN before transitioning to a fully indigenous engine.
- Geopolitical friction: Turkish officials have called the decision politically motivated, linking it to U.S.–Turkey disputes over the S-400 air defense purchase, sanctions, and broader NATO tensions.
Strategic Impact on Turkey’s KAAN Program
1. Production Delays
The block could push KAAN’s first deliveries well past the 2028 projection, affecting Turkey’s airpower roadmap and export contracts.
2. Pressure for Domestic Engine Development
The move forces Turkey to fast-track its TRMotor and TEI engine projects to achieve genuine strategic autonomy.
3. Possible Shift to Non-Western Suppliers
If U.S. export restrictions continue, Ankara may consider Russian or Chinese powerplants — a shift that risks deeper friction with NATO.
4. Alliance Strain
The decision is a stress test for U.S.–Turkey trust, highlighting technology-sharing limits within NATO.
5. Defense Procurement Rebalancing
Turkey is reportedly rethinking its F-16 procurement, potentially redirecting funds to secure engines for KAAN.
Yes Now Discuss How It Effects Pakistan & What Turkey Has Options for Engines
How the KAAN Engine Block Impacts Pakistan
- Export Timeline Risk: Any delay in engine supply also delays Pakistan’s potential KAAN induction, pushing operational capability toward the 2030s.
- Co-Production Bottleneck: Even with a signed co-production deal, Pakistan cannot proceed without a reliable engine source.
- Sanctions & Interoperability Issues: A shift to Russian or Chinese engines could expose Pakistan to secondary sanctions and complicate its integration with existing Western systems.
- Strategic Hedge with China: Islamabad may lean more heavily on its J-10C and JF-17 Block-III fleets and keep the J-35 option alive for near-term stealth capability.
- Regional Signaling: If Indonesia’s KAAN order also slips, Pakistan will likely insist on milestone-based deliveries tied to engine readiness.
Turkey’s Engine Options
- Continue with Available F110 Engines for Prototypes
Useful for flight tests, but cannot sustain full production or exports without U.S. approval.
- Western Engine Collaboration (Rolls-Royce/Kale or EJ200 Derivative)
A viable NATO-compatible option if intellectual property disputes and thrust-class challenges are resolved.
- Indigenous TRMotor/TEI Development (Target ~2032)
Turkey’s long-term solution that would grant strategic independence, but requires time and sustained investment.
- Russian or Chinese Powerplants
Technically possible but politically sensitive, with sanctions risks and potential NATO backlash.
Policy Takeaways for Pakistan
- Two-Track Strategy: Maintain current airpower with J-10C and JF-17 while staying engaged with KAAN — but make engine availability a condition for deeper investment.
- Engine-Contingent Contracts: Secure alternative-engine clauses and milestone-linked payments in any KAAN procurement deal.
- Supply-Chain Shielding: Prepare for sanctions-proof spares and maintenance if Turkey adopts a non-Western engine path.
- Industrial Offsets: Push for technology transfer in propulsion components and FADEC systems to strengthen Pakistan’s domestic aerospace industry.
- Doctrine & Training Preparation: Use this delay window to refine BVR tactics, stealth operations, and distributed maintenance practices that will apply to either KAAN or J-35 platforms.
Analytical Conclusion
The KAAN engine block is more than a supply-chain hiccup — it is a strategic inflection point for Turkey, NATO, and Pakistan. For Ankara, it underscores the urgency of defense-industrial sovereignty and could accelerate its pivot away from over-reliance on Western suppliers. For Pakistan, this is both a challenge and an opportunity: a challenge because it may delay access to a fifth-generation fighter capability, but an opportunity to negotiate stronger industrial participation, technology transfer, and milestone-based contracts.
If Turkey succeeds in fielding a domestic engine by 2032, KAAN could emerge as the Muslim world’s first truly independent fifth-generation fighter program, free from Western veto power. Until then, Pakistan must hedge — balancing near-term requirements with long-term ambitions, ensuring that its airpower modernization is not held hostage by geopolitics.
